State of Utah in the Interest of Charlyne Francis Mitchell : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1959
State of Utah in the Interest of Charlyne Francis
Mitchell : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter > Budge; Earl S. Spafford; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Mitchell, No. 9003 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3280
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
EST OF Case No. 
STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTER- l 
CHARLYNE FRANCIS MITCHELL, 9003 
Minor. 
FILED 
JUN 1 9 1959 
·········--a~-;k:--s·~-?~~-~~---c;;~;,.~---u"i;;;----..g 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
EARL S. SPAFFORD, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Att~rneys for Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF POINTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
POINT I. THE PETITION DOES ALLEGE 
FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONFER JURIS-
DICTION ON THE JUVENILE COURT . . . . . . . 3 
POINT II. THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
POINT III. THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE LAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
CASES CITED 
In Re Olson, 111 Utah 365, 180 P. 2d 210 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 55-10-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953 . . . . . . . . . 4 
Section 55-10-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953 . . . . . . . . . 3, 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTER- l 
EST OF 






Respondent is in substantial accord with the statement 
of facts as contained in appellants' brief. 
It should be particularly noted from an examination 
of the transcript and reports contained herein that Shirley 
Mitchell Holland, the mother, has for some considerable 
period of time, been under close scrutiny by the Department 
of Public Welfare and the custody of one child has been 
subject to supervision by the Welfare Department, and the 
Juvenile Court acting in its behalf. It should further be 
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noted that the Stellys are not parties to this appeal, and 
any arrangement made by the mother with the Stellys con-
cerning an ostensible adoption is not a matter of proper 
consideration for this court. While appellants' attorney 
does in his statement make four assignments. of error, we 
note that nowhere in his brief does he argue directly to the 
assignments, but directs his attention purely to other state-
ment of points. 
In answer to appellants' brief on appeal and in opposi-
tion thereto, respondent makes the following statement of 
points. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE PETITION DOES ALLEGE FACTS SUF-
FICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON 
THE JUVENILE COURT. 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
LAW. 
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THE PETITION DOES ALLEGE FACTS SUF-
FICIENT TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON 
THE JUVENILE COURT. 
Appellant suggests that the petition (R. 22) does not 
allege facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the 
Juvenile Court. In this regard respondent cannot agree. 
We refer the Court to the provisions of the Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, Title 55-10-6, as follows: 
"* * * The words 'neglected child' include: 
"A child who is abandoned by his parent, guar-
dian or custodian. 
"A child who lacks proper parental care by rea-
son of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian or 
custodian. 
"A child whose parent * * * neglects 
to provide proper or necessary subsistence * 
* * * 
* * " 
A cursory examination of the petition discloses a recital of 
facts abundantly sufficient to confer jurisdiction. By the 
language of the petition itself, there is a declaration of 
neglect strengthened by the allegations of the following 
facts: 
"The parents of said child are not married, cer-
tainly an element of irresponsibility. The father of 
said child has never contributed to the support and 
maintenance of said child and has deserted and aban-
doned said mother and said child. This clearly adopts 
the language and intent of the statute. (2) The 
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mother of said child placed said child in the home 
of John Stelly, located at Ogden, Utah, and since 
July, 1955, has failed to support and maintain said 
child in any manner. Therefore said child is depen-
dent upon the charity of others for her care, super-
vision and maintenance." Again a declaration of 
lack of proper parental care, as contemplated by the 
statute. (Italics ours.) 
Respondents' position is unyielding in regard to con-
ferring jurisdiction under the Utah statute above cited. 
The attention of the Court is further directed to Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, 55-10-5, entitled "Jurisdiction of Juvenile 
Courts." We make particular mention of subparagraph 
(1) of said section, which provides: 
"In any case in which the court shall find a 
child neglected, dependent or delinquent, it may, in 
the same or in any subsequent proceedings, upon 
the parents of such child being duly summoned or 
voluntarily appearing as hereinafter provided, pro-
ceed to inquire into the ability of such parents to 
support the child or contribute thereto, or into the 
fitness of such parents to continue in the custody 
and control of such child. The court may enter such 
order or decree as shall be according to law andjor 
equity in the premises, and may enforce the same 
in any way in which a court of law or equity may 
enforce its orders or decrees." 
Thus jurisdiction is clearly granted in the case here pre-
sented. Respondent cites the following case: In Re Olson, 
111 Utah 365, 180 P. 2d 210. In the Olson case, the fact 
that a third person was providing care for a child did not 
deprive the Juvenile Court of jurisdiction to inquire into 
the welfare of the child and to fix responsibility and de-
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termine custody for the child within the scope of statutory 
authority. It is fundamental that where statutes govern 
a situation conferring jurisdiction, considerations of jur-
isdiction are limited to the language of the statute and dicta 
from other jurisdictions can in no way alter the clear and 
convincing meaning as set forth in the statutes. 
Appellant suggests that because the Court made a find-
ing in the case of Charlyne contrary to the finding in the 
case of Sharon, that this apparent inconsistency works in 
support of the Court's error. On the contrary, even if such 
an argument were material herein, it could only serve to 
strengthen respondent's position for 'the reason that sepa-
rate findings in each of the two separate cases show careful 
and considered judgment on the part of the Court, and 
show the evident concern which the Court had in arriving 
at a fair conclusion. Appellant's conclusion cannot be sup-
ported by the transcript and record herein. It is apparent 
that the evidence in the two separate cases was different 
and the treatment of the child in each case by the mother 
was as different as no doubt the personality of the child 
itself. 
We emphasize the fact that the argument concerning 
the two separate cases would in no way alter the conferring 
of jurisdiction by the Court upon the case of Charlyne 
Francis Mitchell. 
POINT II. 
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Appellant asserts that even were the Court to assume 
the petition was sufficient to justify inquiry, notwithstand-
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ing the evidence was totally insufficient to sustain jurisdic-
tion. Such is not a requirement of the law. Under Utah 
law the petition need only allege facts sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction. As to the evidence itself, this becomes a mat-
ter for determination by the Court and in no way affects 
jurisdiction. 
The record presents clear and convincing evidence suf-
ficient to justify the judgment of the Court. 
We refer the Court to the findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law as contained in the record at R. 9. The find-
ings of fact present the basis upon which the Court ruled 
and found judgment against appellants. The findings of 
fact make no mention of the mentality or mental health of 
the mother of the children. The argument of appellant in 
this regard is therefore without merit. 
Appellant argues that the placement of the child with 
the Stelly family shows evidence of proper care rather than 
of neglect. With this we do not agree. Certainly where a 
parent shifts his responsibility to that of another, and there-
after fails to recognize any parental care, it would be un-
reasonable to believe that by so doing they are not neglect-
ing said child. Our Utah statute at 55-10-6 provides that 
a neglected child shall be "a child who lacks proper parental 
care by reason of the fault or habits of the parent, guardiar 
or custodian." The facts in this matter are clear that thE 
child was· placed in the home of another person in order t< 
avoid the parental responsibilities imposed by law upon thE 
mother. It is interesting to note that until this matter wa1 
brought formally before the Court, at no time did the ap· 
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~ellants, either the mother or Mr. and Mrs. Pruitt, show 
.ny real, prolonged or substantial interest in the welfare 
.f the child. Even the mother by her actions preliminary 
o the hearing and thereafter upon interrogation in Court, 
howed a lack of responsibility to the child. We refer the 
~ourt to the transcript, page 9, in this regard. In answer 
o the Court's question: 
"THE COURT: Well, what do you think would 
be the best for them? Do you think it would be 
better to go on like it has been going on or do you 
think that it would be better to have them in some-
one else's home? 
"SHIRLEY MITCHELL HOLLAND: I don't 
know. 
"THE COURT: Looking at it from the stand-
point of the children, not how you may feel about 
it, what do you think? 
"SHIRLEY MITCHELL HOLLAND: I guess 
they would be better off with someone else. I don't 
know." 
In the above exchange, it is apparent that the mother her-
self felt that the best interests of the child would be served 
were they placed in the home of another for rearing. 
Appellant makes reference to the law on adoptions in 
Utah. Respondent fails to see the application of this prin-
ciple in the case at hand. The question of adoption is not 
the real issue in this case. The paramount consideration 
in this case is the neglect of a child by a parent. 
Respondent wishes to state affirmatively that, con-
trary to the position taken by appellants, the judgment is 
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supported by the evidence and the Court did act well within 
its discretion in making findings such as are contained in 
the record. Based upon such argument as appellant 
sets forth, this Court should not lightly turn aside the con-
sidered opinion of the trial judge based upon a careful re-
view of the evidence and records. 
From our examination of the record, there appears to 
be no substantial attempt on the part of the appellants to 
restore the child to the custody of the mother, but rather 
to restore the child to the custody of the grandparents. We 
refer the Court to the transcript, (T. 30), where the grand-
mother in answer to a question by Mr. Oliver, states: 
"That isn't correct because Shirley has had the 
children. It is due to the fact that she has been 
negligent to an extent that has brought me forward 
to try to make a home for the children so that they 
can be together and be raised and live a long life. 
They haven't been because they have been back and 
forth from one place to another." 
We refer the Court to the Welfare Department reports 
which have been made a part of this record and to the com-
ment of the Los Angeles case worker on page 2 of the con-
fidential report of the County of Los Angeles Bureau of 
Adoptions, dated December 5, 1958, and regarding Pruitt, 
Mr. and Mrs. Coy. 
The situation as presented by Mr. and Mrs. 
Pruitt is as follows: Charlyne was. placed in the 
Stelly home by the natural mother approximately 
two years ago, and the Stellys have had full custody 
and control of the child since that time. The natural 
mother apparently, though they did not state this, 
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left the child with the Stellys with the understanding 
that the child would be adopted by them. Until the 
time the Pruitts were notified of the matter pending 
in court, they assumed Charlyne had been adopted 
by the Stellys. Upon learning that the adoption had 
not been completed, they countered the Stellys peti-
tion for adoption of Charlyne with one of their own. 
I would judge from our conversation with the Pruitts 
that their man point of interest is not in adopting 
Charlyne, but rather in keeping the two children to-
gether. Their feeling as to the Stellys appears to 
be mixed. On the one hand they covertly admit that 
they are providing a good home for the child; how-
ever, overtly they told of rumors none of which have 
been verified by. them, as to the neglect of the child 
by the Stellys. It might be significant to note that 
while they knew these rumors to exist, they did not 
go to any lengths to either verify or discount these 
rumors. Neither did they take action to determine 
the exact status of the child until they were informed 
of the instant legal proceeding." 
See the report of December 9, 1958 regarding Charlyne 
Mitchell and signed by L. R. Roylance, commencing at the 
last paragraph of page 1. 
"The child has remained in the Stelly home for 
a goodly length of time. She has. come to accept Mr. 
and Mrs. Stelly as her significant persons. They have 
acted in the full meaning of the· parental role for her 
and give ample evidence of love and solicitation in 
the best interests' of Charlyne. It is my professional 
belief that Shirley Mitchell is a full bloom schizo-
phrenic with all the ramifications involved in such 
a close diagnosis.. Her behaviour over the past is 
indicative of this. Some of her behaviour is a matter 
of court record in previous years. Much of it is con-
tained in records maintained at the various agencies 
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in this city and hospitals and agencies in other lo-
calities. To return the child to the mother would be 
very detrimental. To authorize the Pruitts to adopt 
the child would in effect return the child to the care 
of the mother." 
We refer the Court to the body of these reports and to the 
general tenor of the recommendations contained therein. 
POINT III. 
THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
LAW. 
Respondent fails to see where the conduct of the J uven-
ile Court in allowing a ten minute recess to examine the 
Welfare Department records was in anyway prejudicial to 
the rights of the appellants. We find nothing in the trans-
cript of record in which counsel objected to the length. of 
the recess or asked for additional time to examine there-
ports. Further, counsel had the parties to this proceeding 
present to testify concerning the reports insofar as such 
reports applied to said individuals. 
The reports constituted Welfare Department records 
and were records of investigations which had previously 
been made. Counsel had adequate opportunity to inform 
himself concerning the substance of the reports and there-
upon examine his witnesses with reference thereto. It is 
interesting to respondents to note that a continuance had 
previously been granted on the hearing of this matter by 
the Juvenile Judge in order to give both the appellant and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
the court an opportunity to examine the Welfare Depart-
ment reports. 
In this proceeding, it appears to the respondent quite 
evident that the Court is not being used as a convenient 
vehicle to nullify preferential rights of parents. The rights 
of parents to the custody of their children are preferential, 
it is true, but are in no way absolute where it can be shown 
by competent evidence that the parent is not capable of pro-
viding or willing to show such parental care as the statute 
requires. We submit that the preferential rights of parents 
do not, upon being properly subordinated pass to the grand-
parents. No doubt in a proper case relatives would, by 
assuming custody of a child, aid in protecting the best in-
terests of the child. It is for the Court to determine, how-
ever, what is a proper case. In the instant circumstance, 
the Court has not made such a determination. 
It should be emphasized that the Court has made a 
specific finding that it is detrimental to the interests of the 
child to change the existing placement (R. 9, Finding No. 
7). 
It is apparent to the respondents that this proceeding 
in no way should be construed as. a trial of the Stelly house-
hold. The Court's action in awarding custody to the Stellys 
was quite secondary to the Court's action of depriving the 
mother of such custody. Appellant appears to be dwelling 
in speculation when it is suggested that the Stelly household 
is not suitable or when it is suggested that any reformation 
on the part of Mr. Stelly was motivated by some ulterior 
motive in connection with this proceeding. 
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Yes, the Pruitts were present at the hearings following 
the commencement of this action, and yes, they have shown 
some superficial concern for the welfare of their grand-
children, and yes, they have presented themselves to the 
scrutiny of the Court and subjected themselves to cross 
examination. All of this they have done, but they have done 
none of these in any substantial or continuing fashion until 
such time as this proceeding was instituted. The record is 
replete with suggestions that the Pruitts have heretofore 
exercised little, if any, continuing interest in the child, or 
that they are motivated by anything other than a desire to 
restore the physical custody of the child to their daughter. 
We once again refer the Court to the confidential reports 
heretofore mentioned. In respondent's opinion, the judg-
ment is entirely supported by the law. 
CONCLUSION 
We are here considering the future welfare of a child 
who thus far in her short period of life has experienced 
upheaval after upheaval in being moved from place to place 
and subject to evident parental neglect. It was this circum-
stance that brought the matter to the attention of the Juv-
enile Court, and it became incumbent upon that Court to 
take whatever steps were lawfully within its power to re-
store some order to the life of this child. The Juvenile Court, 
recognizing its moral and legal responsibility to solve the 
dilemma which had been presented to it, caused a hearing 
to be held in which fair, careful and adeqate consideration 
was given to all of the allegations and charges which were 
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,rought before it. Based upon such wen considered evidence 
.nd being completely mindful of its, responsibility to the 
hild and not at all unmindful of the paramount rights of 
he parent, the Court thereupon made findings of fact and 
onclusions of law and entered a judgment according to the 
~vidence presented. The Court has. found in substance that 
he best interests of the child can only be served by allow-
ng it to continue in the home in which it had been placed 
)y the mother and in which common bonds of affection and 
;ies of parental love had been established. The paramount 
~ights to be considered in matters of this sort are not those 
>f the parent, but are those of the child. It is respectfully 
mbmitted that this case is a classic example of what neces-
!arily must be done by courts of proper authority in dis-
~osing of problems involving parental neglect of minor 
!hildren. 
The Court should not quickly be inclined to set aside 
;he judgment rendered herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE, 
Attorney General, 
EARL S. SPAFFORD, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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